Shifting Alliances: Moscow Navigates a Changed Landscape in Post-Assad Syria

In 2017, during the peak of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, the Defense Ministry mistakenly reported that Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani had “lost” an arm due to a Russian airstrike.

Fast forward to October 2025, and that same leader, now known as Ahmed al-Sharaa and serving as Syria’s president, was shaking hands with President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, both arms intact.

Al-Sharaa assumed power on December 8, 2024, after his group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), ousted longtime Kremlin ally Bashar al-Assad, thereby ending over six decades of Assad family reign.

In the year that followed, Moscow was compelled to reassess its strategy towards what was once its ally, which had long provided a critical foothold in the Middle East.

«Russia has reconciled with the reality that its influence in Syria is diminished and is prepared to accept this fragmented presence,» Nikita Smagin, a specialist on Russia’s Middle East policy, shared with The Moscow Times.

Despite the situation, Syria, with its population of 25 million, remains strategically significant for Russia, not only for maintaining regional influence but also for securing military routes to Africa.

HTS continues to be categorized as a terrorist organization in Russia, despite the United States lifting its designation in July 2025.

Nonetheless, this did not prevent Putin from engaging in a two-and-a-half-hour conversation with Al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda member, in October, emphasizing that Russia is always guided by “the interests of the Syrian people.”

Middle East analyst Ruslan Suleymanov pointed out how swiftly Russia has adjusted its strategy concerning Syria.

“Moscow did not assert that Bashar al-Assad was a legitimately elected president [after his removal], even though Putin had previously congratulated him following the May 2021 elections,” he noted.

It appears that Russian officials had established communication channels with militants loyal to the new Syrian regime—either directly or through Turkey—even before they seized complete control of the country.

A significant sign of this, according to Suleymanov, is that HTS fighters refrained from approaching Russian military installations in Khmeimim and Tartus during their rapid advance against Assad’s forces leading up to his removal.

Experts suggest that Al-Sharaa’s trip to Moscow was motivated by shared interests.

The priorities of the newly established Syrian government included seeking legitimacy and accessing Russian economic assistance, encompassing fuel, diesel, and aid in revitalizing the devastated energy sector.

In July, Moscow and Damascus reached an agreement to review existing contracts and agreements, with Russia committing to assist in rebuilding Syria’s war-ravaged economy. Additionally, Russia maintains its role in printing Syria’s currency.

From Moscow’s viewpoint, accepting a reduced presence in Syria is worthwhile to retain access to its vital military bases, crucial for its operations in Africa, according to Smagin.

In 2017, Russia and Syria formalized a 49-year agreement allowing Moscow continued access to the Tartus naval facility and the Khmeimim airbase until 2066.

Established during the Soviet era in the 1970s and upgraded in the 2010s, the Tartus port has long been a key logistical hub for Russia in the Mediterranean, facilitating refueling, resupplying, and repairs of Russian vessels.

Khmeimim, which opened in 2015, has served as a base for Russian airstrikes against both Assad’s adversaries and the Islamic State.

However, early in 2025, Syria’s transitional government declared it would maintain Russian military bases only if they aligned with Damascus’s interests. Subsequently, Syria rescinded a 2019 agreement on the civilian section of Tartus.

Much of the reportedly private discussions between Putin and al-Sharaa centered on the future of these bases, with the Syrian leader assuring they would remain operational.

Nevertheless, Suleymanov remarked that Russia’s overall military presence in Syria has become merely “nominal.”

Throughout the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 and claimed over 300,000 civilian lives, Russia was Assad’s primary foreign ally.

Human rights organizations accused Assad of systematic oppression, torture, and indiscriminate attacks against civilians.

Following his regime’s downfall, Russia granted asylum to Assad and his family, yet details surrounding this arrangement were not divulged.

Al-Sharaa has continually urged Moscow to extradite Assad, and in September, Syria’s new government issued an arrest warrant for him.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refrained from commenting on whether Assad’s fate was discussed during the meeting with Al-Sharaa.

Regardless of his future circumstances, Assad is not enduring significant hardship in his present exile.

Reports indicate that the Assad family commenced purchasing properties in Russia in 2013 and currently possesses at least 18 luxury apartments in Moscow. Additionally, it’s believed that Assad has transferred at least $250 million in cash from Syria to Russian banks, according to the Financial Times.

Approximately 1,200 former Syrian military officers are also said to have fled to Russia after Assad’s fall. According to Reuters, Assad’s former military intelligence chief and a cousin of Assad, both now in exile in Moscow, have reportedly been sending millions of dollars to potential fighters in Syria to oppose the new Damascus leadership and restore their influence.

Suleymanov suggested that the Kremlin has «simply decided to forget about Assad,” who is believed to be maintaining a low profile and spending time playing video games online.

“Assad does not grant interviews, not even to Russian state media. He has essentially been kept out of the limelight,” Suleymanov indicated. “What happened to Assad last year represents a personal defeat for Putin, who put considerable effort and resources into keeping Assad in power.”

While both Moscow and Syria assert that Russia “will play a significant role in the evolution of a new Syria,” analysts note that such dynamics also assist Damascus in balancing its relationships with other key regional players.

“There’s Turkey, the United States, and Israel. Russia serves as a counterweight to these three nations, all of whom maintain military involvements in the area. From this perspective, closer ties between Moscow and the new Syrian authorities are advantageous for both parties,” Suleymanov explained.

Nonetheless, Russia’s influence in the region today is not what it was a decade ago, as the invasion of Ukraine has shifted its focus and unveiled geopolitical miscalculations, he observed.

“Putin can no longer provide assistance to allies or defend them as he could a decade ago when the Kremlin initiated military operations in Syria,” Suleymanov added, while noting that Syria’s transitional leaders still recognize Russia’s ongoing importance.

Smagin remarked that “despite everything, Moscow has managed to adapt its strategy, and it remains a significant and legitimate player in the region in the perception of local states.”