A Shift in Tactics: Russia’s Evolving War Strategy and Its Impact in 2025

By the year 2025, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine had evolved into a protracted war of attrition, with both sides failing to secure a major strategic advantage.

Though the front lines shifted more noticeably in 2025 compared to the previous two years, Russia’s progress remained slow, costly, and limited in scope, resulting in significant losses in both equipment and lives.

In an apparent strategic maneuver to gain leverage in U.S.-facilitated peace negotiations and to depict their victory as a foregone conclusion, Moscow has increasingly showcased its wartime achievements over the past year.

«Ukrainian forces must vacate the territories they currently hold, and only then will the fighting cease. If they refuse, we will achieve this through military means,» President Vladimir Putin stated in late November.

However, the official narrative masks a more intricate reality.

«Up to this point, their advancements have been unimpressive, marked by substantial casualties without achieving their declared goals,» military expert Michael Kofman commented to The Washington Post regarding Russia’s battlefield efficacy in 2025.

The conflict now resembles less a conventional military campaign and more engagements characterized by small infiltration units, volunteer-funded logistics, and the widespread use of inexpensive technologies.

Putin asserted that Russian forces seized nearly 5,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian land in 2025.

In the spring, Moscow expelled Ukrainian troops from their foothold in the Kursk region and briefly pushed into Ukraine’s Sumy region, although that advance quickly stalled and the front lines barely changed afterward.

In eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, Russian troops approached the completion of their capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after nearly two years of conflict.

By year-end, they also claimed to have secured Huliaipole in the Zaporizhzhia region and Siversk in the Donetsk region, where Ukrainian defenses, which had held firm for over three years, crumbled within weeks due to a lack of manpower.

Progress across other fronts was inconsistent, with Russian forces advancing significantly in some areas while only making modest gains in others.

Despite these advances, Russia has not yet secured a conclusive victory.

«The Russian military has held the strategic initiative since 2023. Following a failure to achieve a swift victory in 2022, the war shifted to a protracted struggle, and most changes on the frontlines have been tactical rather than strategic,» noted BBC News military analyst Pavel Aksenov in conversation with The Moscow Times.

Taking advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling manpower, Russian forces increasingly relied on smaller assault groups instead of large armored divisions in 2025. These units exploit weak points, infiltrate Ukrainian positions, and slowly amass forces in crucial areas for gradual territorial gains.

Analysts suggest this method has proven successful in regions like Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and has been replicated in various sectors.

This shift signals a departure from traditional large-scale assaults, which have become excessively costly in an environment densely populated with surveillance and strike drones.

The «grey zone» between Russian- and Ukrainian-held territories has expanded to several kilometers in certain regions.

Drones have come to dominate the airspace, with small infantry units operating on the ground in dispersed formations that prioritize concealment while facing constant attack threats.

According to Atlantic Council analysts, the drone warfare landscape began favoring Russia in late 2024, a trend that picked up pace in 2025.

Russian commanders focused on deploying fiber-optic drones guided by physical cables, which are largely resistant to electronic jamming due to their scale and reliability.

These systems played a critical role in Russia’s early 2025 operations to push Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, where fiber-optic drones targeted ammunition transport and disrupted supply lines.

Moscow later employed similar strategies on the southern and eastern fronts, ambushing Ukrainian vehicle columns far behind the front lines.

By late 2025, Russia had established centralized drone units that train operators in a master-apprentice format and carry out targeted strikes on Ukrainian positions and supply routes.

Neutralizing Ukrainian drone teams has become a priority to grant Russian operators more operational freedom close to the frontlines.

Yet, Aksenov contended that drones alone do not account for Russia’s successes in combat.

«You can’t claim that drones have been a magical solution that entirely changed the course of the war. They are indeed very significant, but not the sole factor. For instance, guided aerial bombs, artillery, and precision missiles are equally important for Russia,» he explained.

Russia has extensively employed guided aerial bombs, including heavy munitions of up to three tons, to dismantle Ukrainian defensive positions.

While the Kremlin replenishes its ranks with new contract soldiers and its defense industry operates at full capacity — often utilizing imported components from countries like China and Iran — analysts assert that the Defense Ministry has struggled to establish a reliable, centralized supply chain.

Volunteer organizations, pro-war bloggers, and private initiatives have raised funds from soldiers and civilians to acquire drones, communication gear, body armor, vehicles, and even basic necessities like tires.

Modified civilian vehicles, many of which sustain only a few days on the battlefield before being destroyed, are used for logistical support and troop transport.

This informal wartime economy has helped sustain operations but remains disorganized and uneven. Some units enjoy a good supply of drones and equipment, while others function with minimal resources.

Aksenov mentioned that these challenges highlight a significant disconnect between Russia’s pre-war planning and the realities of an extended conflict.

A drawn-out war of attrition necessitates a different economic and industrial framework, which Russia has struggled to develop, he noted. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue to make gains as they have discovered effective tactics and adapted to a warfare landscape dominated by drones and artillery.

Another persistent issue facing Russia’s military is the tendency to inflate success reports from the front.

Russian commanders frequently announce captured territories before actual fighting has ceased, a practice termed «capture on credit» by pro-war bloggers. Troops then undertake costly assaults to validate these claims.

In August, commanders first reported that Russian forces had seized Kupiansk in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, even while battles for the city were ongoing. Ukrainian forces recaptured the critical eastern railway hub in September.

The Russian military again claimed to have taken Kupiansk on November 20, yet by December, they still failed to consolidate control over the city, despite senior officers allegedly receiving accolades for its capture. Ukrainian officials later reported successful counterattacks regaining portions of Kupiansk.

While both sides may disseminate false claims about battlefield accomplishments, Aksenov noted that Russian commanders tend to exaggerate their successes more frequently.

Once a location is officially announced as captured, units still engaged in combat in that area may receive diminished support, rendering them more vulnerable to subsequent assaults.

Overall, analysts suggest that Russia has become more adept at waging drone- and artillery-dominated warfare throughout 2025, shifting towards small-unit tactics bolstered by unmanned systems.

Simultaneously, Ukraine’s defensive capabilities continue to wane due to manpower and supply shortages, providing Russia with local opportunities to advance the front lines.

However, without a decisive breakthrough, these dynamics are unlikely to fundamentally change, Aksenov cautioned.

«I don’t believe Russia can pivot towards launching definitive offensives. Even if they manage to breach the Ukrainian front, achieving such a breakthrough necessitates a significant troop presence,» he asserted.

«Currently, Russia does not possess a sufficiently large force on any part of the front. Ukraine demonstrated precisely this type of deep advance in the Kursk region, but we all witnessed how that unfolded,» he concluded.