Russias Search for Fresh Soldiers in 2026: Regional Disparities and Recruitment Challenges

Regions and ethnic republics of Russia have significantly contributed to the manpower needed at the front lines in Ukraine since the beginning of Moscow’s extensive invasion.

With no peace agreement on the horizon, local officials are preparing for another challenging year of meeting military recruitment targets set by the Kremlin—a task becoming increasingly daunting.

The Moscow Times interviewed Maria Vyushkova, a prominent researcher focused on regional and ethnic disparities in casualties from the war, to explore potential strategies Moscow might use to seek new recruits in 2026.

This interview has been trimmed for clarity and brevity.

**The Moscow Times:** Do you anticipate that officials in Russia’s regions and ethnic republics will adopt new strategies for military recruitment in the upcoming year?

**Maria Vyushkova:** Absolutely.

The year 2025 marked the highest number of military casualties for the Russian army since the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To sustain the conflict, the military will need a steady stream of new recruits.

At the same time, both federal and regional budgets are experiencing serious financial constraints. Authorities are struggling to find the funds required to draw men into military service, leading to reductions in contract incentives in some areas.

As a result, tactics involving coercion and deceit are likely to be employed more widely. Businesses may be mandated to provide a specific number of “volunteers” for military service, resulting in pressure being placed on male employees to enlist. Additionally, there could be illegal detentions used as means to force men into signing contracts.

Moreover, conscripts will face heightened pressure from military officials to commit to contracts. In 2024, estimates indicated that about 30% of conscripts opted to sign contracts, suggesting there is potential for this number to rise.

Serving in the military in Russia has become exceedingly hazardous. Authorities are known to employ physical violence against conscripts, subjecting them to torture, manipulating signatures on contracts, and even resorting to lethal measures for those who refuse to comply. I believe such behaviors will become a systemic issue by 2026.

**MT:** Do you foresee any changes in the regions that are most affected by military fatalities?

**MV:** The republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, which experienced the highest total military losses in 2025, are likely to remain at the forefront. Meanwhile, despite its large population, Moscow will likely continue to remain relatively insulated.

Military casualties in the Perm and Kirov regions escalated sharply in 2025, a trend expected to persist into the new year.

I anticipate that the overall patterns will largely remain unchanged, barring a second wave of mobilization. If that occurs, the situation would undoubtedly shift.

**MT:** How do you expect military deaths per capita will change?

**MV:** Ethnic republics will likely continue to feature prominently in the top ten for fatalities per capita.

Regions like Tyva, Buryatia, and Altai, along with the Chukotka autonomous district, are expected to maintain their positions as the most impacted. These areas were disproportionately affected by the mobilization in 2022, and it’s plausible that a similar situation could arise if another round of mobilization occurs.

Interestingly, most republics in the North Caucasus, with the exception of North Ossetia, show a notably low number of identified war deaths per capita, with only Moscow and St. Petersburg reporting lower figures.

The reasons for this are speculative; perhaps the Kremlin is concerned about instability in the Caucasus if a large number of armed individuals with combat experience emerge. However, a more pressing question is whether this will change in the coming year due to the shortage of soldiers for the front lines.

**MT:** What’s the current situation in Buryatia, your home region?

**MV:** The situation in Buryatia is deeply concerning. At the beginning of 2025, Buryatia fell out of the top ten regions in terms of total war-related deaths. At that moment, I had hoped this indicated a cessation of participation in the conflict by the residents of Buryatia.

Regrettably, the republic has re-entered this list, now ranking eighth, which I attribute to the increased financial incentives for signing military contracts introduced in April.

This move is quite extraordinary. Prior to the recent budget crisis, Buryatia was already financially disadvantaged. While other regions opted to reduce military compensation, Buryatia has raised it and maintains high levels of payment.

This decision likely stems from local authorities monitoring the recruiting trends of contract soldiers in the republic. When they observed a downturn, they chose to enhance payments as a means to motivate residents to enlist.

Alexei Tsydenov, the head of Buryatia, is a relatively young and ambitious leader. However, outside of supplying soldiers, he has little to offer Moscow—Buryatia lacks oil and critical manufacturing capabilities.

Thus, the provision of troops for the conflict has become a key measure of effectiveness for governors across Russia, and the decision by Buryatia’s leaders to increase military compensation underscores where their political priorities lie.