Belarus: A Nation Divided Between Resistance and Repression Amidst Geopolitical Tensions

When Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya discusses Belarus today, she first clarifies an important point: “It’s essential to differentiate the [Alexander] Lukashenko regime from the Belarusian populace; we cannot view Belarus as a singular entity.”

Five years after fleeing into exile following her influential run in the 2020 presidential election, which sparked historic pro-democracy demonstrations, Tsikhanouskaya remains a vocal critic of Lukashenko’s government from her residence in Lithuania.

In an interview with The Moscow Times, she cautions that, given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the presence of Russian troops and nuclear arms in Belarus, and persistent tensions at the borders of Europe, the West can no longer afford to overlook Belarus — for its own security.

Tsikhanouskaya is also dedicated to highlighting the continuous repression within Belarus. Although Minsk has freed several dozen political prisoners this year—including her husband, opposition figure Siarhei Tsikhanouski—at least 1,240 individuals are still imprisoned, according to the human rights organization Viasna.

Even amid what she terms “Stalinist-level repression,” Tsikhanouskaya asserts that resistance remains strong, both within Belarus and among the many Belarusians living in exile.

**The Moscow Times:** How do you evaluate Belarus-Russia relations in 2025?

**Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya:** First and foremost, we cannot regard Belarus as a unified entity at this time—it’s crucial to differentiate between the Lukashenko regime and the Belarusian people themselves, as the regime is wholly loyal to Putin. The relationship between Putin and Lukashenko is symbiotic; they rely on one another and leverage their partnership for mutual benefit. For Putin, Lukashenko is a low-cost ally who provides territory, infrastructure, and various other resources necessary for Russia’s agenda in exchange for political and minor economic support.

As for the Belarusian populace, particularly since the onset of the war in Ukraine, there is a palpable inclination towards Europe. It has become evident that the Belarusians cannot associate themselves with Russians, contrary to the claims of Belarusian propaganda. We have shown that we do not share imperial ambitions, nor can we comprehend how anyone would wage war against their neighbors. The Russian leadership appears intent on expanding its influence, seeking to dominate more nations and cultivating satellites—preferring allies like Lukashenko, who follow orders rather than prioritizing the interests of their own nations.

This has led to a strong internal resistance among Belarusians, both domestically and abroad, against this integration, as Lukashenko effectively compromises our sovereignty and independence for his power. Without Putin’s backing, Lukashenko would be ousted in a matter of days. Additionally, the ongoing process of Russification poses a significant threat to Belarusian national identity—it is a means of subjugating our country. There is a real danger that, enabled by Lukashenko, Russia could entirely engulf Belarus politically, economically, and in the media sphere—exactly what we are witnessing currently.

**How do Belarusians perceive this integration process?**

The situation is dire; repression in Belarus is extraordinarily high, rendering public discourse nearly impossible. If someone expresses anti-Lukashenko sentiments, opposes the war in Ukraine, or calls for an end to hostilities, they risk facing many years in prison. This is, quite frankly, an extreme level of repression—there’s no other way to put it. Unfortunately, Belarusians are living in a kind of “safe mode,” operating largely underground, and anti-Russian sentiments are absent from the media because they are simply not tolerated. However, conversations with Belarusians reveal that many recognize the betrayal by Lukashenko in surrendering our sovereignty. Even among officials close to him, dissatisfaction is growing—Lukashenko has overstepped by compromising Belarusian independence. People may hold varied political beliefs. Many officials have long viewed him as the ‘father of Belarus,’ believing the country cannot function without him. Yet even they concur that preserving Belarus’ independence is paramount and that we should never allow Russia to absorb our country.

We have information suggesting that Russia intends to establish a significant arms manufacturing facility in Belarus—data shared by individuals with access to such knowledge. They recognize the necessity of protecting our sovereignty and are attempting to assist in this regard. However, if a journalist were to approach a random person on the street in Belarus for their opinion, they would likely remain silent. Speaking their mind could lead to imprisonment.

Ukrainian intelligence has recently reported new Russian strategies to utilize Belarus for military purposes. How would you evaluate Belarus’s involvement in the war?

It’s crucial to recognize that Belarus comprises both a regime and its people—the two should never be conflated. The Lukashenko regime is entirely responsible for its participation in this aggression, but the Belarusian armed forces’ hesitation to engage in the war reflects the beliefs of the Belarusian people, who do not see the conflict as just.

Lukashenko is fully complicit in this war, helping Russia evade sanctions imposed due to the conflict. He facilitates the acquisition of microchips that Russia cannot obtain legally. Furthermore, around 290 Belarusian enterprises have shifted production from consumer goods to military supplies, producing optics, components, and materials vital for sustaining the Russian war effort. By doing so, Lukashenko becomes a war criminal.

As for the sentiments among Belarusians, there is significant pro-Ukrainian sentiment. People are largely opposed to this war, understanding it to be unjust—a realization that has shocked many. In terms of domestic politics, the narrative that Lukashenko has protected Belarusians from war is no longer convincing; rather, they perceive him as the individual who has drawn Belarus into this conflict. Belarus and Russia now pose a growing threat to NATO countries: drones are deployed from Belarusian territory over Poland, and the border between Lithuania and Belarus is increasingly closed due to frequent smuggling incidents. Such acts typically involve the approval of higher authorities—they are provocations. I believe we will witness an increase in such provocations, as Russia and its ally Lukashenko test NATO’s resolve and its ability to respond. Lukashenko will serve Putin’s interests, utilizing Belarusian territory and infrastructure.

You often stress the importance of Europe recognizing Belarus’s role in terms of European security. How well do you think European leaders and countries comprehend this issue?

This is precisely why we engage with politicians— to instill this understanding in those who shape Europe’s future. Belarus is often viewed merely through a humanitarian lens: political prisoners, repression, the urgent need for their release—as if that is the sole aspect of the situation. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the context has shifted dramatically. It is now undeniable that Belarus—specifically the Belarusian regime—has become an accomplice in this war.

To return to the question, all these provocations at the borders of Poland and Lithuania are being conducted from Belarusian territory. Thus, we continuously communicate to our partners: do not underestimate Belarus. While freeing political prisoners remains crucial, we must also take into account the larger picture. Europe will never truly feel secure while provocations persist, while nuclear arms remain stationed in Belarus, or while unidentified objects fly across borders and are later dismissed as accidents. Such actions compel neighboring countries to divert their focus and resources to border security, rather than aiding Ukraine or fortifying their national defenses. This ongoing tension drains Western resources and attention, and it will continue as long as Lukashenko’s regime endures in Belarus.

The placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus serves as a provocation in and of itself. If the decision is ever made to employ such weapons, they’re most likely to be launched from Belarusian territory. There are many subtleties to consider. We hear discussions of fatigue in Europe—the war has dragged on, and the same applies to concerns relating to Belarus. However, this conflict could soon literally reach Europe’s borders if Belarus remains unliberated and Ukraine is not supported to achieve victory.

Dictators possess a unique mindset; they assert, ‘we can outlast them.’ In democracies, politicians may come and go, but dictators wait patiently. They can afford to sacrifice lives and continue weapon manufacturing. Should a new, less steadfast leader emerge in the West, Putin will exploit that opportunity to advance even further toward Europe.

It’s important to recognize that this is not a conventional conflict akin to World War II—with tanks and aircraft—but rather a hybrid one. When discussing arms, it’s not limited to just drones—there’s also an information war at play. I increasingly observe the ways democratic societies’ perspectives are being tainted by propaganda. It’s all too easy for one to fall into the narrative that ‘you shouldn’t concern yourself with Ukraine or Belarus, just enjoy your comfortable life.’ People seek simple answers to intricate problems, which undermines critical thinking. However, if you do not assist Ukraine and Belarus now, you might become the next target. This reality is precisely why we reach out to politicians—Belarus’ strategic significance for European security cannot be dismissed.

I’d also like to inquire about the apparent warming of relations—at least on the surface—between Lukashenko and the United States. Have the Belarusian opposition’s connections with Washington transformed in this context?

First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge that due to Donald Trump’s diplomatic initiatives, numerous political prisoners were freed—including my husband, Siarhei. This was made possible through efforts from both President Trump and his administration. We are extremely grateful for this, as it represents not just political maneuvering but the fate of thousands of individuals.

Simultaneously, we must contend that Lukashenko remains a dictator who continues to hold countless individuals hostage. He may release a few dozen, but he simultaneously imprisons hundreds more. He utilizes human lives as bargaining chips, hoping to gain concessions and recognition. This exemplifies pure cynicism and aligns perfectly with the behavior of a dictator.

Maintaining the facade of dialogue with the United States is critical for Lukashenko. He aspires to be recognized, to regain acceptability in the West. Historically, he has managed to restore a semblance of a status quo after the elections of 2006 and 2010, but today’s landscape is entirely different. Following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, he has no realistic chance of reclaiming legitimacy. Both the European Union and the United States, as well as Canada and the United Kingdom, have official documents deeming him illegitimate following the 2020 and 2025 elections. He has become a pariah dictator and a war criminal. It’s vital to understand that any interaction—meeting, phone call, or letter—pertaining to Lukashenko does not equate to recognition; rather, it is merely a tactic of pressure. Such engagements do not afford him legitimacy, but he will strive to utilize even the slightest indication of dialogue as evidence of his strength. For him, these interactions serve as public relations strategies.

Furthermore, we comprehend the game Lukashenko is playing: by releasing some prisoners, he aims to lift or alleviate U.S. sanctions. He will leverage that mitigation of pressure as a bargaining chip with the European Union—claiming, ‘Look, we are engaging with the Americans; perhaps it’s time for you to do the same.’ We are monitoring this closely. We witness how Lukashenko’s envoys and supporters in Europe propagate these narratives—advocating for a return to ‘business as usual.’ However, in Europe, there seems to be little appetite for that, at least to my perception, and I am grateful for it.

The West now has a far clearer understanding of Lukashenko’s true nature. The EU’s steadfast stance plays a critical role in this shift. We must certainly welcome any humanitarian gestures aimed at freeing individuals, but we emphasize that these actions should only be the beginning. Genuine change entails the release of all political prisoners, an end to torture and repression, the reinstatement of the rule of law, and the conduction of fresh elections.

You’ve brought attention to the issue of documentation for Belarusians who have fled the country, noting that nearly half a million of these individuals could soon find themselves without valid papers. Has there been any progress regarding the new Belarusian passport initiative, and do Western partners grasp the urgency of the situation?

In truth, the challenges surrounding the legalization and documentation of Belarusians could escalate to a critical level. Since departing the country in 2020, we have been striving to address the issues faced by Belarusians in various nations. This has grown particularly urgent after the regime prohibited its embassies from renewing or exchanging Belarusian passports, leading to a significant dilemma as many people find themselves without any documents. Even seemingly straightforward tasks—like opening a bank account or applying for a visa—become unattainable.

Initially, we began communicating with different countries individually to seek a legally sound solution enabling Belarusians to acquire documents locally, even without a passport. Many countries, including Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, and Germany, are now addressing this issue. Strategies considerably vary, but overall, progress is being made. However, it is not yet widespread, and many individuals’ passports are about to expire.

Thus, we proposed a comprehensive solution. We designed our own document as part of this initiative, targeting particularly EU nations. The concept appears promising since this document technically meets all ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) standards. Yet, political will is essential for its acceptance. When we referred to it as the ‘passport of the New Belarus,’ our intention was for it to serve as an identification document. This does not replace residence permits or eliminate the necessity for individuals to legalize their status in each country. Instead, it serves as an additional ID for those undergoing checks and verifications.

Herein lies a slight dilemma. Those wishing to obtain such documents will have to wait until they gain legal recognition. Our European partners do not currently see a strong demand for this document, although the issue could grow. Currently, we are informing Belarusians that to advance the recognition process, a substantial number of recipients will be needed. We must also acknowledge the propaganda suggesting that individuals acquiring these passports will be labeled extremists or terrorists, and that their property and relatives could be jeopardized. Passport projects are particularly sensitive for the regime. However, this could also serve as leverage to pressure them into reversing their arbitrary decision to stop issuing passports abroad.

Belarusians are facing numerous restrictions. We have jointly prepared a document with the Luxembourg parliament named the ‘Luxembourg Solutions,’ which outlines the various challenges faced by Belarusians abroad and methods to tackle them. In short, we are not neglecting these issues. We are actively working to support Belarusians in distress.