Russia Navigates Reputational Risk as U.S. Takes Control of Venezuelan Leadership

In May 2025, President Vladimir Putin extended a “warm” welcome to Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro at the Kremlin, wishing him “all the best” as they formalized a strategic partnership.

However, since the recent U.S. takeover of Maduro and the declaration of oversight over Venezuela, a close Russian ally in South America, Putin has remained notably quiet.

As Maduro faces criminal charges in New York, the Kremlin seems to be adopting a cautious approach towards the Trump administration’s aggressive moves to reinforce its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Analysts suggest that while the arrest of Maduro could tarnish Russia’s image as a dependable partner, the overall political and economic repercussions for Moscow are likely to be minimal.

“Russia has never had particularly strong diplomatic or military ties in Latin America,” revealed former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev to The Moscow Times. “What it stands to lose in Venezuela are [oil] contracts and investments.”

Moscow has demanded Maduro’s release but has not taken any significant actions to support him following the U.S. operation. Additionally, it has expressed support for Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez, denouncing what it terms “neocolonial threats and foreign aggression.”

Similarly, when U.S. authorities seized a Russian-flagged oil tanker associated with Venezuela in the North Atlantic this week, Moscow condemned Washington for inflating tensions, yet refrained from any direct response.

“Officials and propagandists in Russia find themselves in a difficult situation,” commented Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“There are no directives—nor will there be—regarding a severance of ties with Trump,” Baunov stated in a Telegram post. “At the same time, they are compelled to denounce the aggression towards an ally because the so-called global majority is observing.”

“Conversely, displaying excessive outrage would only emphasize their own inability: they could not assist, avert, or delay this situation,” he added.

Venezuela remains one of the few nations that maintained amicable relations with Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Meanwhile, dialogue between Russia and the U.S. has resumed since Trump returned to office, as he seeks to negotiate a peace agreement regarding Ukraine.

“The United States has illustrated what a ‘special military operation’ entails. It is evident that in Russia they will have to confront the question: why were we unable to achieve a similar outcome [in Ukraine]?” Baunov commented.

Pro-Kremlin commentators have adopted a varied stance on Maduro’s arrest, criticizing it as illegal under international law while contrasting the U.S. success with Russia’s failure to unseat Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2022.

While Putin might face some reputational harm for not safeguarding an ally, he could leverage Maduro’s situation to his advantage in the context of the Ukraine conflict, according to Bondarev.

“The U.S. is already signaling its readiness to partition the world into spheres of influence,” Bondarev posited to The Moscow Times.

“Yet Putin aspires to establish his own sphere as well. The recent developments in Venezuela could potentially benefit him—providing an opportunity to discuss [spheres of influence] directly with Trump,” Bondarev suggested.

“Moreover, new justifications for Putin’s actions in Ukraine may arise: ‘If Trump is pursuing his interests, why can’t we do the same?’”

Experts also indicate that the economic repercussions for Moscow are likely to be limited.

The Trump administration has informed Rodríguez that Caracas must comply with the White House’s requirements before it can increase oil production, which is vital to its economy, as reported by ABC News.

Among these conditions is the requirement for Venezuela to expel Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, along with severing their economic links. Caracas must also agree to partner exclusively with the U.S. regarding oil production and prioritize Washington when selling heavy crude, according to sources familiar with the U.S. strategy.

Trade between Russia and Venezuela amounted to approximately $200 million in 2024, contrasted with $245 billion in trade between Russia and China, noted the exiled news outlet Agentstvo.

Russian exports to Venezuela primarily consist of oil products, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural goods, as mentioned by Russian Ambassador Sergei Melik-Bagdasarov.

In 2025, Russia became a crucial supplier of the petroleum products needed to dilute Venezuela’s heavy crude after U.S. shipments ceased, as reported by Bloomberg. Caracas has also approved an extension of oil joint ventures between state-owned PDVSA and Russia’s Roszarubezhneft, allowing operations to continue until 2041 with an estimated investment of around $616 million.

However, according to Stanislav Mitrakhovich, an expert at Russia’s National Energy Security Fund, Russia no longer possesses significant oil ventures in Venezuela.

“Relative to what existed 10-15 years ago, this is now a relatively minor operation,” Mitrakhovich noted to the Kommersant business daily. “There may have been strategic plans concerning Russia’s influence in this region, but in terms of economic projects yielding significant profits, there are none left.”

In addition to oil products, Venezuela has acquired weapons from Russia, including man-portable air-defense systems, tanks, and air defense equipment. Russian imports mainly consist of agricultural products like cocoa, coffee, tropical fruits, and alcoholic beverages.

Despite the rhetoric from the Trump administration asserting that “this is OUR hemisphere,” industrial expert Maxim Khudalov informed Kommersant that Russia is unlikely to withdraw completely from the region.

“Based on the current state of dialogue with the Americans, it seems they remain receptive to cooperation, including with [Russia],” Khudalov said.

While the precise economic implications of a change in Venezuela’s leadership for Russia remain uncertain, Baunov also pointed out that the political ramifications for Moscow are similarly ambiguous.

“If Trump successfully instigates a regime change not only in Venezuela but also in Iran, Putin will be weakened. If [Trump] encounters obstacles or is bogged down, [Putin] will gain strength. It may even turn out that he needs some form of assistance from Putin,” he remarked.

“The challenge with such American initiatives is their asymmetry: they are only feasible in this manner against vulnerable states,” he explained.

“Venezuela is an exceedingly weak country… such actions tend to bolster the notion that the strong can dictate terms to the weak,” Baunov added, highlighting that for Moscow, “the collection of useful precedents has expanded.”